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Following a decade of piloting different models of contracting, in mid-2009 the Cambodian Ministry of
Health began to test a form of ‘internal contracting’ for health care delivery in selected health districts
(including hospitals and health centers) contracted by the provincial health department as Special
Operating Agencies (SOAs) and provided with greater management autonomy. This study assesses the
internal contracting approach as a means for improving the management of district health services and
strengthening service delivery. While the study may contribute to the emerging ﬁeld now known as
performance-based ﬁnancing, the lessons deal more broadly with the impact of management reform and
increased autonomy in contrast to traditional public sector line-management and budgeting. Carried out
during 2011, the study was based on: (i) a review of the literature and of operational documents; (ii)
primary data from semi-structured key informant interviews with 20 health ofﬁcials in two provinces
involved in four SOA pilot districts; and (iii) routine data from the 2011 SOA performance monitoring
report. Five prerequisites were identiﬁed for effective contract management and improved service de-
livery: a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by the contracting parties; implementation of
clear rules and procedures; effective management of performance; effective monitoring of the contract;
and adequate and timely provision of resources. Both the level and allocation of incentives and man-
agement bottlenecks at various levels continue to impede implementation. We conclude that, in con-
tracted arrangements like these, the clear separation of contracting functions (purchasing,
commissioning, monitoring and regulating), management autonomy where responsibilities are genu-
inely devolved and accepted, and the provision of resources adequate to meet contract demands are
necessary conditions for success.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Since the late 1990s, Cambodia has piloted different methods of
contracting government health services to expand provision and
improve efﬁciency. During the ﬁrst phase from 1999 to 2003 both
contracting-in methods were piloted in three health districts and
contracting-out in two districts with support principally from the
Asian Development Bank (Bhushan, Keller, & Schwartz, 2002).
Under contracting-in, the contractor (an international non-
government organisation/NGO) worked within the Ministry of
Health (MOH) system to strengthen the existing district adminis-
trative structure, but without the right to hire or ﬁre health
workers. Under contracting-out, the contracted NGO had complete
responsibility for service delivery, including hiring and ﬁring,ambodia), þ61 430 827 788
.
Y-NC-ND license.setting wages, procuring supplies and organizing health facilities.
During a second phase in 2004e2008, a hybrid of these two ap-
proaches was implemented in 11 of a total of 77 health districts
nationally under the donor-funded Health Sector Support Project
(HSSP) (MOH, 2007). Under the hybrid approach, NGOs were con-
tracted with the MOH to provide staff supervision and manage
service delivery, applying civil service regulations but with the
right to hire staff independently to ﬁll shortages.
In 2009, a new pilot using an internal contracting approach was
implemented, as part of a national public sector reform program, in
the 11 health districts previously contracted to NGOs in the second
phase. These districts have been converted to Special Operating
Agencies (SOA) with semi-autonomous status within the MOH and
are contracted to deliver services by their respective Provincial
Health Department (PHD). This marks a return of management to
the national staff of the MOH and a major policy shift in the
management of district health service delivery.
This article assesses the performance of the SOAs as a means for
improving the management of district health services and
K. Khim, P.L. Annear / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 241e249242strengthening service delivery. It addresses the question: What is the
impact of, and what are the success factors for, this type of internal
contracting arrangement?We investigate the experience gained from
the implementation of the SOA internal contracting pilot in Cambodia
to identify the lessons learned for policymaking designed to improve
the management and delivery of public health services in similar
developing country settings.
Contracting is one component of the New Public Management
approach of the 1980’s and 1990’s (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994;
Perrot, 2012). New Public Management is a set of management
concepts that introduces market approaches to the public sector
with the aim of improving the efﬁciency of public services (Craig
and Porter, 2006). Contracting is based on principal-agent theory,
likened to the purchasereprovider split, where the contract is a tool
binding the relationship. The principal, or purchaser, is a party to
the contract and pays for services or products delivered by the
agent, or provider, in accordance with the conditions stated in the
contract (Hood, 1991). The theory assumes that individual parties
act on self-interest and try to gain as much proﬁt as possible from
the contract delivery. However, internal contracting arrangements
rely on ‘relational’ contracts that are commonly based on trust and
cooperation and may be less detailed than for external contracting
(Perrot, 2006).
To prevent unfair advantages in the transaction, extra efforts on
the part of principal are needed, such as collecting relevant infor-
mation before contract negotiation and strict monitoring. These
activities incur additional costs, commonly called transaction costs.
To enforce compliance, contracts need to be formulated in detail to
include conditions of payment based on outputs produced or
sanctions against lack of or delay in delivering results (Duran et al.,
2005). Contract monitoring then becomes essential to enforce de-
livery of outputs, provide an early warning on the implementation
process and guard against gaming (e.g. faking numbers, mis-
reporting). As the nature of the services or products becomes more
complex, the contract becomes more detailed and the process for
contract monitoring becomes more intensive, expensive and
complicated (Forder, Robinson, & Hardy, 2005).
It is argued this form of contracting provides a greater focus on
the achievement of results, overcomes the constraints that prevent
governments from effectively using the resources made available to
them (the absorptive capacity), takes advantages of private sector
ﬂexibility and efﬁciency for improving public services, introduces
competition (bidding) to increase effectiveness and efﬁciency of
services (Batley & Larbi, 2004, chap. 7; Loevinsohn & Harding,
2005a) and may help increase equity in accessing services (i.e. by
including conditions of equity in the contract) (England, 2004). For
example, evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo in-
dicates that a change from input budgeting to output-based con-
tracting resulted in increased technical efﬁciency and was cost-
effective (Soeters, Peerenboom, Mushagalusa, & Kimanuka, 2011).
Nevertheless, contracting has a number of shortcomings. In
judging efﬁciency, transaction costs (which are sometimes hidden
and can be very expensive) must be taken in to consideration
(Guinness, 2011), and contracting may not improve efﬁciency in
settings where only a few, often inefﬁcient, contractors enter into
competition (Loevinsohn & Harding, 2005a). Where hospitals are a
natural monopoly, competition may be introduced by contracting-
in private management, though patronage and corruption can
make it difﬁcult to replace under-performing staff and contractors
(Batley & Larbi, 2004, chap. 7). Contracting requires sufﬁcient ca-
pacity to design, manage and monitor contracts and a robust
governance and administrative system (Abramson, 2009, chap. 1;
Zaidi et al., 2011). As these areas are often weak in developing
countries, some researchers argue it is risky to transfer such con-
cepts to less-developed countries (Eldridge & Palmer, 2009). Evenso, researchers argue that contracting using the performance-based
ﬁnancing (PBF) approach is more ﬂexible and practical and may
alleviate these systemic challenges (Macqa and Chiema, 2011).
Setting detailed ground rules helps avoid conﬂicts and assure the
success of contracting (Kadai, Sall, Andriantsara, & Perrot, 2006).
Within the contracting framework, agents or providers are
granted ﬂexibility in hiring and ﬁring the staff or implementers
who deliver services (Vujicic et al., 2009). Pay-for-performance
incentives that are common to contracting approaches, including
PBF, seem to be effective in developing countries where typically
low ofﬁcial salaries erode motivation. The value of PBF approaches
is a matter of discussion in the literature, with a number of authors
interpreting the PBF concept narrowly as a contracting methodol-
ogy (Eldridge & Palmer, 2009; Fretheim et al., 2012) while others
consider it a more inclusive health ﬁnancing reform (Soeters,
Habineza, & Peerenboom, 2006; Soeters et al., 2011). Most studies
of contracting schemes have focused on the outcomes in health
service delivery (Basinga et al., 2011; Eichler, Levine, & Group,
2009). In Cambodia, Loevinsohn and Harding (2005a, 2005b) and
Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose (2008) indicated that contracting was
relatively more robust than routine government health services in
terms of access to and delivery of basic health services. Keller et al.
(2008) showed that performance-based contracting implemented
by NGOs with additional resources for hiring more staff and staff
incentives led to an enhanced level of service delivery compared to
non-contracted health districts without the intervention. Else-
where, the impact of pay-for-performance schemes (including PBF)
on health service delivery and health outcomes was found to vary,
with some indicators improving more than others (Banerjee et al.,
2010; Basinga et al., 2011; Basinga et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012;
Soeters et al., 2011). Some authors argue that impact evaluation e
which does not take account of contextual factors and other
system-wide effectse is not suitable for assessing PBF schemes and
fails to reveal their real value (Fretheim et al., 2012).
There are few studies, however, of the design and process of
contracting interventions (Ssengooba et al., 2012) and little is
known about why and how contracting approaches contribute to
the improvement (or lack of improvement) of health system per-
formance (Basinga et al., 2011). Using empirical evidence collected
during the ﬁrst author’s doctoral research, and building on exten-
sive experience in health systems research in Cambodia, this paper
aims to ﬁll the gap by examining Cambodia’s internal contracting
arrangement. The preliminary results of this study were ﬁrst pre-
sented to the Health System Reform in Asia Conference, Hong Kong,
December 2010, sponsored by Social Science & Medicine.
Internal contracting in Cambodia
In Cambodia, internal contracting spans the three levels of the
public health system: the central level comprises the MOH, its
subsidiary departments, and national disease-control centers; a
second level is administered by the PHD, including provincial
hospitals; and the third level is the health Operational District (OD),
which includes a referral hospital and health centers.
The MOH’s Health Strategic Plan 2008e2015 identiﬁes the SOA
as an institutional design and contracting as a strategy for
improving the accountability, efﬁciency, equity and quality of
government health service administration (MOH, 2008; RGC, 2008,
2009). All the 11 ODs formerly contracted to NGOs became SOAs
with semi-autonomous status in mid-2009. An additional funding
package, called a Service Delivery Grant (SDG), was made available
to SOAs for staff incentives and other activities, funded through the
HSSP.
By the end of 2010, 22 ODs had become SOAs under relational
contracts between the different levels of theMOH (see Fig. 1): PHDs
pPHD
SOA management
Referral 
Hospital 
Head (s)
Health center 
chiefs
Individual 
staff
Individual 
staff
Services Delivery Agreement
MOH/ HSSP
Performance contract
Three parties: SOA 
management, facility 
chief and individual 
staff
Provincial Health System
District health 
system
Performance 
Agreement
Fig. 1. Contracting mechanisms and parties.
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ment under which the PHD acts as a commissioner; the SOA dis-
tricts represented by their directors are contracted by the PHD
through a Service Delivery Agreement; within each SOA, health
facilities (referral hospital and health centers) are contracted by the
SOA with each party represented by the head of the institution; at
facility level, performance contracts are made between the head of
the facility and each staff member. A pre-SOA survey indicated that
most of the 11 former contracting districts scored lower than 50%
against assessment criteria (Chev, 2012). Former NGO contractors
provided 6e12 months capacity building for these ODs, and a
Performance Management and Accountability System e which
requires individual staff to plan their assigned activities, accept a
performance review on a regular basis, and consider how they may
overcome constraints e has been recommended (see Fig. 2).
The key stipulations in the contract between the PHD and the
SOA are: responsibilities of the contracting parties, service provi-
sion, resource needs, performance achievement and sanctions,
ﬁnancing and legal representations. The most important commit-
ments of the PHD are to provide ﬁnancial resources, drugs and
medical supplies to the SOA in a timely and transparent manner
and to support the SOA in enforcing a performance management
system, including reshufﬂing of non-performing staff. The SOA is
required to comply with the three golden rules: no under-the-table
payments, no pilfering of clients or conduct of private services in
the public facilities, and no pilfering of drugs and medical supplies
from the public facilities. Incentives are paid in full when targets are
achieved and are reducedwhen the level of achievement falls short.
Facility chiefs are responsible for achieving the contracted outputs,External Auditing 
(finance & technical)
Central 
Monitoring Teams
PHD
SOA 
Monitoring 
team
quarterly
Bi-monthly
quarterly
2011 onward: 
quarterly
SOA Management
Referral Hospital
Health Centersmonthly
Members 
drawn fromMonitoring 
to
MOH
SOA
Fig. 2. Monitoring framework of SOA.failure of which, if persistent, may lead to freezing of the incentive
package.
Funding for SOA districts comes from three major sources: the
government budget, the SDGs and user fees. The government line-
item budget accounts for 50%e70% of the SOA budget and is
provided to the SOA as a quarterly advance through routine
government channels (MEF, 2011). The SDG, a direct grant from
HSSP pooled donor-government funds, is transferred through pri-
vate banks directly to SOA accounts quarterly following reports.
User fees come both from paying clients and from fee-exemption
reimbursements paid by Health Equity Funds, Community-Based
Health Insurance and voucher schemes.
Monitoring groupswere established in each SOA, at the PHD and
at the MOH central level. The SOA monitoring groups are drawn
from the SOA management team. There is a PHD monitoring team
comprising senior ofﬁcials holding incentive-funded posts to sup-
port SOAs. At the central level, Service Delivery Monitoring Groups
were created in late-2009 tomonitor the performance of PHDs, ODs
and SOAs. Additionally, an independent, external consulting ﬁrm is
selected to conduct auditing of ﬁnancial and service delivery
matters.
Methods of data collection and analysis
Selection of study sites
Primary data were collected during 2011 in four of the total 22
SOA districts purposively selected as typical examples of the con-
tracting experience: Memot, Cheung Prey and Chamka Leu (all
under Kompong Cham Provincial Health Department), and Ang
Roka (under the Takeo Provincial Health Department). All four SOAs
had been contracted to NGOs as part of the previous contracting
arrangements. As three of these SOAs are internally contracted by
the same PHD (Kampong Cham), a comparative analysis of man-
agement in the three SOAs and their relations with the PHD is
possible. The characteristics of the four selected SOAs are summa-
rized in Table 1.
Methods of data collection
The study was based on a review of the literature and of key
operational documents, key informant interviews and routine
monitoring data from the MOH. The operational documents
(including the SOA guide, SOA ﬁnancial management manual and
SDG manual) were written mainly by international technical ex-
perts to establish the rules and procedure required of the MOH,
PHDs and SOAs in the implementation of internal contacting.
Primary qualitative data was collected through semi-structured
key informant interviews as part of the ﬁeldwork for a doctoral
study by the ﬁrst author in December 2010 and January 2011. Key
informants represented senior managers responsible for imple-
mentation of the SOA arrangements, including four ofﬁcials from
the central MOH, 12 ofﬁcials from the management teams of the
four selected SOAs and four ofﬁcials from the presiding PHDs. A set
of question guides was developed to investigate the respondents’
experience and the issues they had in performing their roles and
delivering contract outputs. Informants were invited to provide
informed consent and asked to participate in the study on a
voluntary basis. The interviews were conducted by the ﬁrst author
in Khmer. They were voice recorded, later transcribed in Khmer and
then translated into English by the ﬁrst author. Due to the small
number of key informant interviews, analysis was carried out using
simple spreadsheets. The study received ethical approval from the
Ethics Committee for health research of the Ministry of Health,
Cambodia, and from the University of Melbourne.
Table 1
Characteristics of the four SOA districts in the study.a
District Memot Ang Roka Chamkaleu Cheung Prey
Province Kompong Cham Takeo Kompong Cham Kompong Cham
Geography Far east plateau
bordering Vietnam
Central south plain Central east Central plain
Population (2011) 137,141 140,151 164,561 200,675
Administrative districts 1 1 2 2
Number of communes 10 12 12 22
Number of villages 175 191 118 154
Established as SOA April 2009 April 2009 January 2010 January 2010
Contracting experience 1999e2002 & 2004e2008 1999e2002 & 2004e2008 2004e2008 2004e2008
Contracting parties 1-PHD-MOH
2-SOA-PHD,
3-SOA-Facility,
4-Facility-each staff
1-PHD-MOH
2-SOA-PHD,
3-SOA-Facility,
4-Facility-each staff
1-PHD-MOH
2-SOA-PHD,
3-SOA-Facility,
4-Facility-each staff
1-PHD-MOH
2-SOA-PHD,
3-SOA-Facility,
4-Facility-each staff
Health Centers 10 10 14 22
Referral Hospital 1 1 1 2
Budget Total (US$)
of which:b 1,308,187 1,172,556 760,384 1,631,945
Government budget 815,942 909,759 409,913c 1,086,073
Service Delivery Grant 169,326 168,264 200,000 250,000
User feesd 67,232 65,831 73,171 86,855
HEF 73,619 165,29 77,300 90,146
CBHI n/s 20,588 n/s n/s
Other sources (NGO) 173,601 n/a n/a 131,371
Per capita SDG allocation 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24
Notes: n/a: data not available; n/s: no scheme.
a Source: Services Delivery Grant agreements of the four SOAs.
b Data from original sources do not add up.
c Not including cost of drugs/medical supplies.
d Forecast based on previous year, not including HEF and CBHI.
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annual monitoring report for 2011, which provides a year-by-year
summary of OD performance over three years (2008e2010)
under the HSSP (2009e2013). The six indicators extracted from
the monitoring report for analysis in this paper are: childbirth by
trained health staff, childbirth at health facility, use of modern
contraceptive methods, measles vaccination of children under one
year, outpatient consultation and antenatal care second visit. These
data were taken from the MOH’s Health Information System
database, aggregated at district level and by type of health district
(SOA versus non-SOA) by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of
HSSP with the primary aim of tracking the service delivery per-
formance of the different types of health districts.
The analytical approach
The analytical framework for this study is constructed in two
parts (see Table 2). The ﬁrst part is based on the modality of con-
tract management, which comprises three elements: (i) the man-
agement of the contract and its stipulations about roles and
responsibilities, approaches to service delivery and performance
targets; (ii) the SOA status of the health districts and the extent ofTable 2
Analytical approach: criteria related to contracting arrangements.
The contract SOA
Contract management Contract stipulations, including roles and
responsibilities, approaches to achieve targets
(incentive payments); and performance targets
How
to m
on w
Convergent themes 1 Understanding the contract, roles and
responsibilities;
2 Performance management
3 Provision of resources
4 Rules and procedures;
5 Contract monitoring.
Source: The authors.autonomy exercised by the SOA management; and (iii) the re-
sources provided to SOA and issues arising during the imple-
mentation. The second part of the analytical approach is based on
ﬁve areas that emerged as common themes from a preliminary
analysis of the key informant interview data, where we aimed to
identify the constraints and the lessons learned from the imple-
mentation of the SOA pilot. The ﬁve themes that emerged are:
understanding of contract and the roles and responsibilities; per-
formance management; provision of resources; rules and pro-
cedures; and monitoring of contract. Additionally, we analyzed
routine service delivery data and the SOA monitoring reports to
measure how well SOA districts performed in delivering services.
Results
In the following section we analyze contract management mo-
dalities under the ﬁve convergent themes to assess the evidence on
the results of the pilot program. The achievements in service de-
livery are then assessed, based on the routine data extracted from
monitoring reports. The constraints, the lessons learned and the
policy implications are summarized in the Discussion and
Conclusion sections.status Resources/Additional funding Objective
much power
ake decisions;
hat matters
Human resources; ﬁnancial
resources; provision issues
(timeliness and adequacy)
Improved service delivery
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Ofﬁcials from the MOH, PHD and SOAs all agreed that a clear
deﬁnition of roles and responsibilities helped to re-orient them.
The contracts were viewed as clarifying and enforcing agreed
performance targets and providing ground rules for the conduct of
each party. The SOA and PHD respondents generally thought there
was little change to their former duties (as director of the OD or
member of the management team), but took pride in the new ar-
rangements and expressed a sense of greater ownership. According
to one SOA director, “During the previous form of external con-
tracting we had NGOs to help; now, with the experience we have,
we need to demonstrate we can do without them.”
However, the SOA ofﬁcials reported a number of concerns with
the monitoring indicators included in the contract, particularly the
large number of indicators, the choice of indicators and the setting
of indicator targets. The need to report in 2011 on almost double
the number of indicators compared to previous NGO contracting
period (20 c.f. 11) raised concerns particularly related to the existing
OD capacity and the availability of services. For example, an indi-
cator on diabetes treatment was included though providers had not
been trained and necessary drugs and medical equipment not
supplied. As well, the lack of complete data for some indicators and
the choice of denominators (for example, number of children under
one year old) made it difﬁcult to set realistic targets, for immuni-
zation. In terms of output measurement, the ofﬁcials agreed that
the misreporting of service outputs had dramatically decreased
thanks to regular monitoring, random veriﬁcation and the avail-
ability of web-based reporting.
Despite a good understanding of the contract and their roles, SOA
managers thought performance was constrained by a lack of timely
support or approval from higher levels on matters related to ex-
penses, recruitment, personnelmanagement and resource allocation.
For example, it took several months to appoint NGOs for capacity
development. As well, incentives for positions within the PHD to
support SOA implementation were absent as the positions were
canceled in late 2009byahigher governmentorder.Nevertheless, the
involvement of the PHD in the contracting framework e which was
absent in the previous NGO contracting arrangement e was seen as
advantageous to the health system.
Performance management
Performance management and incentives apply to both indi-
vidual and institutional performance. Each staff member had a
performance contract with explicitly stated roles, targets and ex-
pected incentives, and had to achieve the targets in order to receive
100% of the incentive. The facility chiefs and SOA management
would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to enforce staff contracts without perfor-
mance incentives, partly because government salaries were low
and the health staff relied on the incentives payments. As a speciﬁc
mechanism attached to the internal contracting arrangement, the
SDG performance incentive was only one of a number of incentive
payments to the staff but nonetheless provided signiﬁcant moti-
vation. However, the proposed Performance Management
Accountability System had not been implemented in the four SOAs
because staff were not familiar with it and needed more time to
formulate a monthly or quarterly plan. According to some ofﬁcials,
the system requires excessive administration and paperwork,
diverting staff time from actual services provision.
SOA ofﬁcials explained that the performance contract encour-
aged facility managers to promote a team spirit and a conducive
work environment and to think creatively in managing staff re-
lations. The directors of the four SOAs generally believed that
without the monitoring of performance they would not get theexpected results. They reported that facility monitoring had been
conducted on a monthly basis, which therefore compelled collab-
oration and put additional pressure on the facility chief and under-
performing staff. The monitoring score given to a facility was
factored into the incentive package, which helped to reduce free-
riding. Measures designed to counter under-performance or
shirking included the deduction of incentives or referral to the SOA
management for disciplinary action, though these were rarely
applied. Nevertheless, reported complaints from health staff
included alleged favoritism or nepotism, a sense of unfair advan-
tage by facility chiefs over incentive levels and a lack of information
about incentive deductions.
The SOA ofﬁcials indicated that the extent of private practice
among primary care providers appeared to have fallen as a result of
the performance management arrangements and the extra income
earned from the incentives. However, many medical doctors at
referral hospitals had maintained their private practice because the
incomes they earned in this way still exceeded the additional in-
centives received from public practice.
Provision of resources
While the government budget and SDG account for up to 95% of
SOA revenue, SOA districts reported common delays in the receipt
of funds and their inadequacy. Though timely in 2009, in 2010 the
ﬁrst installment of SDGs was delayed for several months, primarily
due to prolonged contract negotiation. Delays in payment and the
different timing of government budget and SDG allocations made it
difﬁcult for facilities to fulﬁll their work plan. On many occasions,
staff members were told to carry out activities with a promise of
payment a couple of months later. Mission funds for outreach ac-
tivities (in Khmer luy pesakakam) and night-duty payments (in
Khmer Luy Yeam) paid out of the government budget were often
delayed, perhaps by up to a year.
SDGs could be used at the discretion of SOA directors, according
to the rules and procedures in the SDG manual. Facility managers
received a total budget for incentive payments and allocated these
to staff according to a formula agreed between SOA and facility
managers. While this was a clear example of increased manage-
ment autonomy, SOA directors reported a lack of clear instructions
for the use of SDG funds as the rules were still being formulated,
discussed and negotiated. This sometimes led to misallocation. In
2009, for example, one SOA used more than the 80% of the SDG
allowed for staff incentives and left some program activities un-
funded, a practice that was viewed as bold and risky. While SOA
managers could recruit additional contracted staff paid from the
SDG, recruitment met signiﬁcant delays, due mainly to delay in
approvals for hiring new staff, the low pay scale, and the limited
number of qualiﬁed applicants. Wages for new recruits had to be
balanced with those for existing staff to prevent jealousy. While the
guidelines for hiring new staff were designed to promote fair
competition, attract the best staff and prevent nepotism, they had
been unavailable when the SOAs were launched. According to one
SOA director, “New recruits tend to be fromwithin the district. as
thewages are not high enough to attract good ones or those outside
the district”. Midwives were especially difﬁcult to attract, particu-
larly due to competition from NGOs working in the area.
The need for clear rules and procedures
The detailed rules and instructions for resource utilization
required to support autonomous management were inadequate,
resulting in delayed implementation of contract requirements.
Under MOH rules (as the principal), the autonomy of SOAmanagers
is limited to the use of SDG funds for hiring additional staff, staff
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precisely what activities were eligible for the 20% of SDG funds not
assigned to staff incentives, how the SOAs could access the funds
that were retained at the central level, and how recruitment of
contract staff should proceed. Community engagement activities
were deemed necessary but funding for this was approved only in
late 2010. Many SOA ofﬁcials would not risk using the funds fearing
they would be asked to pay back.
Monitoring of contract implementation
Respondents thought that monitoring e which was required at
the central, provincial and SOA levels e had helped to improve the
quality of services, ensure staff availability and reduce absenteeism.
All four SOAs in the study had established monitoring teams
ranging from four to eight persons drawn from the SOA manage-
ment teams. Monitoring tools for health centers and referral hos-
pitals (usually modeled on the previous NGO contracting
arrangements) varied by SOA. Monitoring teams commonly visited
the facilities, completed checklists, calculated the facility score, met
the staff to discuss the results and visited a few clients selected
from the facility register for veriﬁcation. Additional health-facility
spot-checks at night or during non-working hours were occasion-
ally conducted to enforce 24-hour service availability. Apparently,
some health center staff complained that monitoring was stricter
than previous contracting and their facility performance scores
were often reduced.
The monitoring role of the PHD and of the central monitoring
teams had not been carried out effectively. First, monitoring ac-
tivities had not been included in routine PHD annual operational
plans and the budget was therefore not available. As well, PHD
monitoring staff had not received incentive payments as the posts
were canceled in late 2009. Secondly, PHD ofﬁcials referred to
routine integrated supervision visits as taking on a dual role in
monitoring as there was no dedicated tool to monitor the SOAs.
Only a fraction of the planned monitoring visits by the central
SDMG teams were completed in 2010 due to other work commit-
ments, the lack of monitoring tools and the lack of vehicles and
travel expenses. While it appeared independent auditing had been
conducted successfully, despite coordination problems and delays
in selection of the auditor, the overlap in monitoring between the
SDMG, the PHD and the external auditing ﬁrmwas seen by some as
inefﬁcient.
Comparative performance of contracted and non-contracted
districts
Data from routine annual monitoring for 2011 includes ODs
contracted previously to NGOs, those established as SOAs and those
without contracting. Service delivery indicators are summarized inTable 3
Service delivery indicators by type of health district.
Type of health district 2008
NGO contract
(n ¼ 11)
Non-contract
(n ¼ 66)
Outpatient visit per capita 0.5 0.3
Delivery by trained staff (%) 45.3 40.2
Delivery at facilities (%) 33.5 25.1
Current use of Birth Spacing methods (%) 29.5 23.3
Antenatal care 2nd visit (%) 72.2 64.4
Measles vaccination among children under 1 (%) 82.9 80.3
Note: Diff. ¼ Difference between the types of districts; ﬁgures in brackets are numbers
a SOA was implemented in the 11 districts for half year of 2009.
b 11 more health districts were converted to SOA in 2010. Source: MOH monitoring rTable 3. Generally, the contracting districts (previously NGO and
later SOA districts) began in 2008 at a level above the non-
contracting districts. The rate of improvement in service delivery
indicators across the three years was similar for the two groups,
and the elevated level of the contracting/SOA districts was main-
tained in 2010. These results indicate that, despite the constraints
noted above and the slow implementation of SOA arrangements,
the SOA districts maintained the elevated level of service delivery
established by the earlier external contracting approach. This is a
signiﬁcant outcome considering the transfer back to MOH re-
sponsibility and establishes internal contracting as an effective
approach with additional advantages related to local ownership,
sustainability and cost reduction (see Khim & Annear, 2010). Even
so, it is difﬁcult to attribute these continued improvements in
service delivery to the SOA arrangements as the selected districts
had many other ongoing interventions as well, such as community
engagement activities, CBHI or HEFs.
Discussion
Using Cambodia as a case study, this article investigates the
challenges faced in institutionalizing management autonomy and
performance-based incentives as the means for strengthening
health service delivery in the public sector. In this section we
discuss further the lesson learned for policy makers seeking to
strengthen the management and delivery of public health services
in similar developing country settings. We identify the success
factors for this type of internal contracting arrangement, which
differs from other emerging PBF approaches by focusing more on
strengthening the MOH’s own management structures.
Strengthening health service management and delivery
Outcomes from the implementation of internal contracting ar-
rangements as a means for improving the management of district
health services and strengthening service delivery in Cambodia
were consistent with earlier external forms of contracting. A sig-
niﬁcant difference is, however, was an increase in the sense of
national ownership in health management and service delivery.
This sense of local ownership and responsibility led to improved
sustainability of ﬁnancing and of management capacity and greater
engagement by the government, despite apparent shortcomings.
The government contribution to the SDGs increased from 10% in
2010 to 30% in 2012 (Ly & Sim, 2012). District management gained a
sense of responsibility and beneﬁted additionally from the capacity
building program provided by NGOs (Miller, 2011). Despite the
constraints, the SOAs demonstrated an ability to secure additional
staff, procure additional supplies and establish rules related to staff
performance. Also strengthened was the oversight role of the PHD
as commissioner of services supporting the SOAs (COM, 2010).2009a 2010b
Diff. SOA
(n ¼ 11)
Non-SOA
(n ¼ 66)
Diff. SOA
(n ¼ 22)
Non-SOA
(n ¼ 55)
Diff.
0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.2
5.1 53.3 47.4 5.9 57.9 51.4 6.5
8.4 43.6 35.6 8 48 43.3 4.7
6.2 26.1 22.4 3.7 34.2 26.9 7.3
7.8 82.5 77.8 4.7 77.6 68.3 9.3
2.6 98.2 99.4 1.2 114.1 111.2 2.9
of health districts by type of intervention.
eport 2011.
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approach in Cambodia differs from other performance-based ap-
proaches and deals more comprehensively withMOHmanagement
arrangements. Under the SOA approach, the PHD at one level and
the SOA management team (through its chief) at another level
represent the purchaser of health services while the health facility
chiefs represent the providers. In practice, the SOA team performs
three distinct roles: purchasing, fund holding and monitoring/
veriﬁcation (under which regulation is subsumed). Clearly, in this
arrangement, there is the danger of a conﬂict of interest that could
disadvantage health facility staff.
SOA ofﬁcials met additional obstacles impeding their manage-
ment performance, including delay in approvals for hiring new
staff, the low pay scale and the limited number of qualiﬁed appli-
cants for newly created positions. Nonetheless, the health facility
staff responded well to the incentive payments made through the
SOA. Ofﬁcial health worker salaries are insufﬁcient to meet basic
living needs and the SOA incentives were seen to supplement the
staff income pool. When coupled with performance management,
the incentives encouraged providers to exert more effort in their
work, a ﬁnding consistent with many earlier PBF studies (Rusa,
Schneidman, Fritsche, & Musango, 2009; Vujicic et al., 2009).
However, while the incentives werewelcomed, they alonewere not
sufﬁcient and required as well an active approach to performance
management. The ﬁnding that the current incentive levels had a
greater effect on the behavior of primary care providers, and less so
for medical doctors at referral hospitals, supports previous ﬁndings
that differentiation in incentive levels is important (Vujicic, 2009).
Early delays in the disbursement of SDG funds, due mainly to
prolonged contract negotiations, were apparently overcome in
subsequent years. However, difﬁculties remained in the system of
disbursement of the government budget, the size of the SDG allo-
cation, and coordination between these two funding sources,
though new arrangements indicate optimism (MEF, 2011).
Lessons learned
A number of important lessons ﬂow from this analysis of the
Cambodian experience. These relate broadly to the separation of
functions, the challenges of autonomous management, dual prac-
tice and other inefﬁciencies, and the success factors for this form of
internal contracting.
Public health sector reform built on the purchasereprovider
split is complex. Using the PHD and/or district health manage-
ment team as both contractor and monitoring agency involves an
inherent risk that can best be addressed by a clear separation of
contracting (commissioning, purchasing) and regulatory (moni-
toring) functions. This remains true within government structures.
Interventions using the PBF approach have also realized the bene-
ﬁts of a clear separation between purchasing, fund holding, regu-
lation, service provision and monitoring of results (Cordaid & SINA,
2012). Moreover, such reforms are more effective where manage-
ment responsibilities are genuinely devolved and accepted, and the
provision of resources is adequate to meet contract demands.
Assigning an autonomous role to district health managers is not
sufﬁcient in the absence of a real ability to hire staff and control
budgets (within established regulations). One constraint in
Cambodia was the absence of clear instructions about the use of
special grants (SDGs) for staff incentives and additional supplies.
The rules were still being formulated, discussed and negotiated,
leading to a danger of misallocation. In 2009, for example, one SOA
used more than the 80% of the SDG allowed for staff incentives and
left some program activities unfunded, a practice that was viewed
by the district managers as bold and risky. A similar lack of clear
procedures also left the door open to nepotism in staffappointments. At stake is not a lack of autonomy in principle but
the lack of clear structures needed to support autonomous
management.
While the internal contracting arrangements and performance
contracting were designed to retain qualiﬁed staff in the public
sector, many medical doctors at the referral hospitals maintained
their private practice. Consistent with other country examples, it
appears that medical staff need to be guaranteed a certain level of
incentive payments (representing a major proportion of what they
may have earned privately) before they curtail their private prac-
tice. This reinforces the need for structures that support autono-
mousmanagement and staff supervision. It also implies the need to
unify various disparate incentive payment systems into a single,
clear and manageable payment subject to performance.
More needs to be known about the relative efﬁciency of per-
formance contracting. On the one hand, output-based contracting
can lead to efﬁciencies in the use of resources and reduced over-
heads. On the other hand, contracting involves sometime hidden
but often quite onerous transactions costs, particularly in the area
of contract monitoring and veriﬁcation.Success factors
There are, therefore, identiﬁable conditions that lead to
improved service delivery through internal contracting, based on
the presence of a clear performance contract, performance in-
centives and regular monitoring. We identiﬁed ﬁve success factors:
 A clear understanding by the contracting parties of their roles
and responsibilities;
 Establishment of clear rules and procedures for implementation;
 Adequate and timely provision of resources;
 Effective management of performance;
 Effective monitoring of the contract.Recommendations and conclusions
The internal contracting approach has the potential to improve
service delivery, provided that the administrative procedures
identiﬁed here are implemented. From the Cambodia example it is
possible to identify a number of recommendations that can
improve outcomes based on the internal contracting approach.
 The clear separation of functions between actors (i.e.
commissioner, purchaser, provider, monitoring agent, regu-
lator) is necessary to enable each to carry out their role more
effectively and improve overall governance; the purchasing
and monitoring roles of the principal to the contract (such as a
provincial health department) must be carefully delineated by
different performance contracts.
 The development of clear rules and procedures to improve the
objective functioning of the different parties to the contract is
assisted by the creation of appropriate methods and tools and
provision of adequate resources; this creates a system appro-
priate for transparent delivery of contract outcomes. Careful
selection of an appropriate range of indicators improves the
effectiveness of contract monitoring; international experience
indicates that selection of indicators that are speciﬁc,
measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART)
assists in tracking the performance of contracted parties to
identify and resolve management bottlenecks.
 Allocating genuine responsibility to health facility managers,
together with the application of a ﬁnancial management in-
strument with appropriate indicators to monitor performance,
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payments and can address issues related to nepotism.
 To be effective, staff incentives need to be regarded as adequate
by the health workers and paid in a timely manner; where staff
members receive bonus payments from various sources, the
challenge is to unify the incentive payment system in a single
clear payment based on all health facility revenues with
appropriate monitoring (c.f. Cordaid & SINA, 2012).
 If not administered carefully, performance incentives can crowd
out intrinsic motivation of health care professionals and
adversely affect the service quality (Eichler et al., 2009;
Woolhandler et al., 2012). Careful monitoring of the role of in-
centives in staff performance and their impact on the quality and
quantity of services delivery is warranted (c.f. Vujicic, 2009).
This study of internal contracting in Cambodia has some inherent
limitations. The sample size was relatively small, comprising only
four SOAs in two provinces and 20 key informants. As well, three of
the four SOAs were in one province, which presents a danger of
selection bias in the results. However, we believe that the conditions
in these SOAs are similar to most others. While there are potential
differences in contract management experiences across all SOAs,
there is no reason to expect wide variation in outcomes. As well,
demographic, cultural and economic conditions are relatively uni-
form across Cambodia’s 20 provinces, where the population is pre-
dominantly rural and engaged in subsistence rice farming. We
interviewed SOA managers to assess changes in their performance
and their attitudes toward the new management arrangements. A
broader evaluation of SOAs and their impact on health outcomes
would require a broader sample of different providers, patients and
community members. Even so, the results are indicative of con-
tracting practices within SOAs and allow us to identify the most
pertinent questions for further investigation. Two other limitations
include the absence of a statistical control for many other changes in
the health sector which may have inﬂuenced the SOA service de-
livery outcomes and the lack ofmore deﬁnitive outcomemeasures of
SOA achievement.
The internal contracting approach adopted in Cambodia pro-
duced a sense of national ownership in health care delivery and
maintained improvements in service delivery. Further investigation
of the impact of internal contracting and performance-based
ﬁnancing on the management of health services and of their
system-wide effect is warranted to understand how and why the
approach works, or does not work.
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